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1 Introduction
Until the mid of the eighties environmental policies in the Netherlands were cha-
racterized by a separate approach to each environmental sector, a very low
participation of policy target populations in the policy making process, optimistic
and therefore ambitious goals, and direct regulations (permitting) as a dominant
policy instrument. These policy characteristics seem to be related to a lack of
orientation of policy makers on policy target populations (a weak commitment)
and on a lack of structured contacts between both (a weak interrelatedness). In
more theoretical sense we might expect that in a combination of weak interre-
latedness and weak commitment there is a tendency among policy makers to
hardly resist ambitious goals and to force behavioral changes by means of a
regulatory stick. On the other hand, a combination of strong commitment and
strong interrelatedness probably will lead to resistance of policy makers to goals
which require ambitious behavioral changes of the target group. This is more
the case for a target group serving policy making institution, for example a mini-
stry of agriculture which has to incorporate environmental policies. In such a
situation a preference is expected for instruments that support the target group
by stimulating innovations and by creating conditions which will help the target
group to maintain its economic strength (Bressers and Kuks, 1992).
It is since the mid of the eighties that the Dutch ministry of the environment tries
to shift its policy strategy between these two extremes from a rather isolated
policy making position to a situation in which target groups are more consulta-
ted in the policy making process and in which stimulation of selfregulation by
target groups is experimented as an alternative steering approach. This shift is
part of an effort of the environmental ministry in the eighties to construct inte-
grative perspectives on which the formulation of policy goals and the choice of
policy instruments could be based. One of such integrative perspectives was to
formulate environmental problem based themes, like the acid rain problem, in
order to evaluate policy efforts on their contribution to the reduction of this envi-
ronmental problem type. However each integrative perspective has its
limitations: actions which are good to reduce the acid rain problem might be
bad in relation to another part of the environment. For example farmers which
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2are changing the way in which they apply fertilizers by directly working the ma-
nure into the soil in order to reduce ammoniac emissions into the air, create
new problems from a groundwater quality point of view. Therefore, besides a
`theme oriented policy approach’, a `target population oriented approach’ was
developed as another integrative perspective in order to deal with integration
problems at the level of policy target populations (and as a third integrative per-
spective even an `area oriented policy approach’ has been developed).
However due to a target population oriented approach policy makers do face
new problems concerning the accessibility of target populations. Since some
populations are hardly organized as a group, it is difficult to get access to them
through intermediairy groups or representatives. And in case that populations
are organized as a group, some groups are more homogenous and therefore
better to understand than other groups which are more heterogeneous and the-
refore performing a greater internal variety. In this paper we intend to show the
consequences of the accessibility of target populations for the design of a tar-
get population oriented environmental policy. At first we present an overview of
the way in which in the Netherlands a target group policy has been developed
for industries as a rather accessible population. Secondly, we discuss the pro-
blems that will arise when a target population is more diffuse, by using
environmental policies that are targeting on consumers as an example. For
both types of target populations we conclude which consequences their acces-
sibility has for the characteristics of the policies designed. As far as the target
group policy for industries is concerned we also discuss to what extent it might
be succesfull and to what aspects of this policy we need to be critical.
32 Developments in Dutch Environmental Policy
2.1 The seventies
The policy with regard to environmental care within firms, introduced by the gov-
ernment during the late eighties, can be seen as a necessary response to the
experiences which were acquired with environmental policy in the early seventies.
The development of environmental legislation during the seventies was an at-
tempt to respond quickly and forcefully to the growing awareness of the
seriousness of the environmental problem. In the light of the fact that many sec-
tors of society (and the corresponding Ministries such as Economic Affairs,
Agriculture and Traffic and Waterways) were still far from being convinced of the
seriousness of the environmental problem, the young Ministry of the Environment
(the then Ministry of Environmental Hygiene) had little choice but to opt for a rela-
tively isolated development of environmental legislation. In view of political
pressure to do something about the environmental problems quickly, this ap-
peared to be at any rate a forceful, and as such, initially also politically
satisfactory response. Thus the strategy of environmental policy during the sev-
enties was characterized by an individual approach per environmental com-
partment: a limited role of target groups in policy-making, optimistic and ambitious
objectives; licensing systems as the dominant policy instrument (Bressers, 1991,
p. 13).
Harsh reality proved to be considerably more obstinate, however, than the
(relative) simplicity of the legislation process. The implementation and enforce-
ment of the licensing systems, which allotted important tasks to the local
authorities (the provinces, water board and municipalities), worked out differently
than was expected. Thus an evaluation study about the functioning of the Nui-
sance Act showed, for instance, that many organizations that were under
obligation to have a license did not in fact have such a license, that in the organi-
zations that did have a license licensing regulations were often inadequately
formulated or obsolete, that compliance with the licensing regulations was insuffi-
ciently verified, and that in cases where violations were found, often no sanctions
were imposed (Berenschot, 1982).
Explanations for the disappointing effectiveness of environmental legisla-
tion were first sought among the local authorities that were charged with its
implementation. Over the years they had been given an increasing number of
tasks in the areas of licensing and enforcement, while the civil apparatus that was
charged with these tasks hardly increased at all in proportion to this. This led to a
major backlog in the issuing of licenses, and often there was insufficient time to
adequately customize the formulation of regulations. In addition it appeared to be
physically almost impossible to check firms permanently or periodically with a
high frequency. This would make checks highly labor-intensive and expensive.
Partly because of this regulations tended to become obsolete in organizations
where conditions changed.
The fact that regulations were often inadequately formulated can also be
attributed to a lack of expertise on the part of civil apparatus with regard to the
specific situation within the various organizations to which the licenses are sup-
posed to apply. After all, one cannot expect an environmental official of a
municipality to have a complete insight into how the air emissions of a galvanic
firm should be regulated, and at the same time understand the noise pollution
problems of a potato-peeling machine in the local potato salad plant.
4Furthermore, an important explanation for this lack of effectiveness was
attributed to the limited influence of target groups on the legislative process,
which resulted in the fact that too little support was obtained for the policy. It is
not all that difficult to stipulate by law that a firm without an adequate license
should be closed down, but to see to it that the municipality actually takes such a
decision and then successfully implements it is quite a different matter. Environ-
mental policy did not have enough in-depth support to be taken seriously by the
sectors that were addressed, or the means of power to simply force a change in
behavior without such support. It is significant in this context that environmental
policy has long had a ‘soft’ image.
2.2 The eighties
Particularly since the arrival on the scene of Winsemius (originally employed as a
business consultant) as Minister of the Environment  (1982-1986) attempts have
been made to change the image of environmental policy. First action was taken
to improve the implementation and enforcement of the licensing process. This in-
volved creating possibilities for municipalities to receive a financial contribution
from the state for the executive tasks with which they were charged in the context
of environmental policy. This money could be used both to add to their capacity
and for additional training of their environmental employees.
Action was also taken to develop universal regulations for certain catego-
ries of firms with relatively straightforward environmental problems (such as car
garage firms). No individual licenses need to be issued to such firms anymore;
notification by the firm in question is sufficient, after which the universal regula-
tions (as laid down in a General Order in Council on the basis of the
Environmental Control Act) apply. Because licensing was replaced by a notifica-
tion obligation, which put the initiative with the firm, implementation in such cases
can be limited to simply enforcement.
Furthermore, on the basis of the simple argument that people will only lis-
ten to you if you are prepared to first listen to them, starting from the early
eighties serious consultations were begun with various target groups of the policy
on the basis of equality. It was hoped that such consultations would increase
public support of environmental policies. After all, the target groups (represented
by their central organizations, such as the branch associations in business and
industry) get the opportunity to influence the objectives of the policy. On the other
hand, they do commit themselves to the eventual results of the negotiations (laid
down in covenants). Because although these are gentlemen’s agreements on a
voluntary basis, compliance with these agreements is not quite without obligation.
These agreements can even be formalized by the licensing institutions at the de-
centralized level in the form of license regulations.
Another important aspect of consultation with target groups is that better
use is made of the know-how that they possess, for instance regarding specific
aspects of the production process in a certain industrial branch. After all, the
know-how that is required in order to realize a reduction of environmental pollu-
tion may be largely found with those who caused this pollution. Environmental
problems are often so complex that one-sided steering by outsiders is often
doomed to failure. This gives licensors the opportunity to limit themselves to
regulations with regard to the objectives that have to be realized, while previously
much use was still made of means regulations which precisely instruct an organi-
zation how it is supposed to deal with a certain environmental problem. Means
5regulations only stipulate the final situation which has to be achieved. The licen-
see himself can determine how this situation is to be achieved. Since here
negotiations so far have dealt only with objectives, the target groups are also
forced, during these negotiations, to make a realistic assessment of what they
feel is feasible.
In addition, an important function of negotiations with target groups is that
they may lead to interiorization. Interiorization can be seen as a process where
those who contribute to the development of environmental problems (the target
groups) recognize their own responsibility for the environment and, on the basis
of this recognition, take their measures to reduce environmental pollution at their
own initiative. Thus, interiorization can be combined with more room for self-
regulation. The government is faced with a role where it has to indicate what the
minimum requirements are, while target groups in society have to assess what
else they can achieve on the basis of their own responsibilities. Another advan-
tage of this is that dependency on licenses as an instrument is reduced, while the
scope of the policy is broadened and the policy becomes less vulnerable. To
make ambitious objectives feasible, it makes sense not to ‘put all one’s eggs in
one basket’ (that of licenses), but to leave one’s options open.
Another reason for the development of target group policy lay in the fact
that sectoral legislation proved to involve many adjustment problems. Thus,
measures to reduce emissions into the air which are taken on the basis of one
law may result in more emissions into the water, which should precisely be pre-
vented by means of another law. This confronts firms with conflicting demands.
These contradictions could be solved by setting up an integral approach at the
level of industrial branches or individual firms. Target group policy is seen as the
best way possible to accomplish this adjustment or ‘integration’.
Since the outlines of target group policy were sketched in the National En-
vironmental Policy Plan (1989) a beginning was made with the application of this
policy in practice. Naturally, it is important here which target groups are being dis-
tinguished. In practice the following classification is used:
- agriculture;
- traffic and transport;
- industry;
- the energy sector;
- refineries;
- construction;
- waste utilization firms;
- consumers and retail trade.
It will be obvious that these target groups are of a rather different charac-
ter. Thus, for instance the target groups `energy sector' and `refineries' are far
more homogeneous than the target group `industry', which basically consists of a
conglomerate of various target groups at the level of branches of industry. Thus
individual target group policies are developed for each target group.
63 Dutch environmental policy for the target group industry
Since the end of the eighties the Dutch government has been trying to develop a
two-track environmental policy designed specifically for the target group industry.
On the one hand the government wants to follow a stimulation policy which gives
firms the chance of self-regulation. With this the government hopes to achieve
that firms will not just follow the lead of the government, but will also develop their
own initiatives and take every opportunity within the organization which may re-
sult in environmental improvements. This may be realized by introducing a
system of environmental care within the organization. In addition to stimulation
policies the government is also following a target group policy where agreements
are made per industrial branch about the environmental efforts which have to be
undertaken by the branch in question in the long run. These agreements are
made on the basis of equality for as much as possible, where the industrial
branch in question can indicate for itself which efforts it considers feasible in the
long run. Basically, target group policy indicates which results should minimally
be achieved through self-regulation.
In  paragraph 3.1 we discuss the contents of stimulation policy. This policy
was set up in the late eighties. Meanwhile it has resulted in a great many initia-
tives,  not only with industrial production firms and business service organizations
(such as trading companies and banks), but also with institutions in the areas of
health care, government institutions (such as municipal firms), social service in-
stitutions (such as neighbourhood centers) and other non-profit organizations. In
paragraph 3.2 we will discuss the contents of target group policy. Each year
covenants are drawn up with the help of a few selected branches of industry,
which have to be worked out in detail within the industrial branch in question.
Thus at the moment we have covenants for e.g. the wood preservation industry,
the basic metals industry, the printing industry and the chemical industry.
3.1 Stimulation policies with regard to environmental care within firms
The government feels that the best way to implement self-regulation within or-
ganizations is by setting a system of environmental care within the firms
themselves. This involves the incorporation of environmental care in the organi-
zation by means of tasks and procedures. The aim of the government here is to
force the organizations to be alert to the possibility of environmental pollution, and
to force them to try to limit or prevent such pollution. Eventually this can make
environmental care, just like e.g. quality control and the care for good working
conditions, a permanent point of attention within an organization. Although envi-
ronmental care within firms refers primarily to industrial production firms, because
they cause the most extensive environmental pollution, it is the government’s ex-
press intention to stimulate environmental care also in other types of
organizations which are relatively far less polluting.
The position of the government with regard to the way in which environ-
mental self-regulation would have to be designed was formulated in the
Memorandum ‘Environmental Care within Firms’ (Ministry of the Environment,
1989). With this memorandum the government officially announced what it
wishes to achieve in the field of environmental care systems within firms and
which activities it considers necessary for this purpose. An environmental care
system is defined by the government as `the coherent whole of policy measures,
both organizational and administrative, aimed at gaining insight into, controlling,
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ronment'. In this context it is important to recognize the difference between
environmental care and an environmental care system. Each effort undertaken
internally by an organization to improve the environment can be seen as envi-
ronmental care. An environmental care system, on the other hand, refers to the
tasks and procedures required within the organization to see to it that the organi-
zation is involved in environmental care. Thus an environmental care system in
fact controls environmental care within the organization.
It was the aim of the government that by 1995 all firms within the Nether-
lands that caused  medium to extensive pollution or specific environmental risks
(some 10,000 tot 12,000 firms) would possess a well-functioning system of envi-
ronmental care, adapted to the nature, size and complexity of each firm. For firms
that were less environmentally polluting (an estimated number of  250,000) the
target was less ambitious. Here by 1995 clear steps would have to be taken to-
wards the introduction of a system of environmental care in all branches where
these firms are present. With its policy the government wanted to cover practi-
cally all production firms and service organizations within the Netherlands. To this
end a ‘Program Bureau for Environmental Care within Firms’ was set up within
the Ministry of the Environment, which was charged with the implementation and
coordination of an `activities program’. This program offered financial support to
stimulation- and teaching projects and to activities having to do with enlighten-
ment, training and education. In fact branch organizations, company
environmental services and other business organizations were stimulated by this
program to set up activities which could support the introduction of environmental
care in the individual firms. This eventually resulted in the emergence of an ex-
tensive network of organizations that could be enlisted by firms for services
concerning ‘in-house’ environmental care.
With its stimulation policy the government has assumed for the time being
that firms and other organizations will voluntarily adopt a system of environmental
care. To still keep in touch with current developments, in 1992 an preliminary re-
port was drawn up, commissioned by the Ministry of the Environment, to
determine whether enough progress had been made in business and industry.
This report showed that of the 250,000 group some 90  percent of the relevant
branches is involved in the development and introduction of a branch system of
environmental care. Thus the target that the branches within this group need to
have taken clear steps towards the introduction of a branch system of environ-
mental care had already been largely met in 1992. As far as the 10,000 group is
concerned the target is more ambitious: in 1995 all these firms have to possess
their own fully functional system  of environmental care. The intermediate bal-
ance of 1992 showed that this target is still far from being met. On the basis of
this preliminary report it was expected that in 1995 from 40 to 65 percent of these
firms would have made significant progress towards the introduction of an envi-
ronmental care system. In spite of this prospect the government did not decide to
make environmental care obligatory on the basis of this preliminary report. The
approach remains a voluntary one. It was decided, though, to increase pressure
on the 10,000 group to speed up the introduction of a system of environmental
care. Five different instruments are applied for this purpose:
1 Licensing is intended to stimulate the introduction of environmental care, spe-
cifically by proposing a linkage between the environmental care system and
the environmental license, making current licensing regulations simpler and
more flexible.
82 Target group policies for industry are intended to stimulate the introduction of
environmental care systems.
3 Normalization and certification are intended to offer firms clear support and
recognition for the introduction of an environmental care system.
4 Firms are to be obliged by law to submit an environmental report.
5 Extension of the enforcement instrumentarium is being considered; this would
make it possible to force firms that seriously violate their environmental li-
censes to commission an investigation at their own expense.
The use of these five instruments is coordinated with the progress that firms have
made so far. Thus normalization and certification are specifically intended to give
extra support in the right direction to the ‘forerunners’. Instruments such as target
group policies and licensing will be applied mainly to convince the ‘middle group'.
And the `laggards' will have to be coerced mainly by means of stricter enforce-
ment procedures and, where necessary, an in-depth investigation will be imposed
(Ministry of the Environment, 1993).
3.2 Target group policies for industry
The stimulation policy for ‘in-house’ environmental care within firms supports
firms in setting up their own systems of environmental care. Its intention is to en-
able firms to design their own responsibilities on a voluntary basis. However,
voluntariness does not imply lack of obligation. Therefore the government is fol-
lowing a so-called ‘target group policy’, where agreements are made for each
branch of industry regarding the environmental efforts that this branch should un-
dertake in the long run. These agreements are made on the basis of equality for
as much as possible, where the industrial branch itself can indicate which efforts
it feels are feasible in the long run. Target group policy basically indicates which
results should at least be achieved through self-regulation. Another function of
target group policy is to make environmental policies more coherent. Because
environmental legislation was introduced on a sectoral basis there have always
been many adjustment problems, also because different institutions of the local
authorities are charged with the implementation of environmental legislation (i.e.,
licensing). Thus, measures to prevent emissions into the air which are taken on
the basis of one law may result precisely in more emissions into the water, which
should be prevented on the basis of another law. Thus firms are faced with con-
flicting requirements. These contradictions could be solved by arriving at an
integral approach at the branch level or at the level of the individual firms. Target
group policy is seen as the perfect method to accomplish this adjustment (inte-
gration). Basically this means that per industrial branch a covenant is concluded
which sets out integral objectives with regard to the environmental problem for
each industrial branch. These covenants also involve representatives of the li-
censing institutions (such as the Association of Dutch Municipalities, the Inter-
Provincial Council and the Union of Water Boards). Licensors at the local level
are bound by these agreements.
Although it seems to involve only one target group, industry in fact consists of a
conglomerate of industrial branches. Examples are the food- and stimulants in-
dustry, the textiles industry, the paper industry, the printing industry, the chemical
industry, and the basic metals industry. Target group policy approaches these
branches individually. The various branches differ considerably in terms of the
type of environmental problems they face and the possibilities they have for doing
9something about them. A branch-wise approach will enable a better adjustment
of the control of these environmental problems. However, the way in which in-
dustrial branches are approached is identical, the only difference being that
homogeneous and heterogeneous branches of industry are distinguished.
A homogeneous branch of industry consists of firms with very similar
products and industrial processes. The production process of a homogeneous
branch of industry is relatively simple. An example of a homogeneous branch of
industry is the printing industry. This homogeneity enables a standardized ap-
proach to environmental problems, As far as environmental licensing is
concerned, these branches usually depend on the municipalities and water
boards as the competent authorities. Examples of homogeneous branches are
considered to be the graphic industry, the brick industry, the concrete industry,
the wood preservation industry, the leather industry, and the mineral products
industry.
A heterogeneous branch of industry consists of large and complex firms
with very dissimilar environmental problems which require equally dissimilar solu-
tions. An example of  a heterogeneous branch of industry is the chemical
industry. In a heterogeneous branch of industry a standardized approach is not
possible. For these branches of industry the competent authorities are usually the
provinces and the Department of Ways and Communications (the Ministry of
Traffic and Waterways) (Ministry of the Environment, 1992-1). Examples of hete-
rogeneous branches are considered to be the basic metal industry, the
chemical industry, the dairy foods industry, the textile industry, the meat indu-
stry, the paper industry, and the rubber/plastics industry.
The branch-wise approach of target group policy distinguishes six steps,
which are applied differently on some points to homogeneous and to heteroge-
neous branches of industry.
Figure 1 The six-step approach of target group policy
Source: Brochure ‘Environment & Industry Nr. 1 (1992, p. 11)
The first step consists of the formulation of  emission reduction targets. This
means that for each branch of industry long-term and medium-term environ-
mental targets are formulated (the year 2000 and 2010). These targets are
deduced from those of theme-oriented policies.
The second step involves the selection of the branches of industry. Not all
groups of firms are included. Selection criteria are the extent of environmental
pollution they cause, the number of firms within the industrial branch (the more
firms, the more effective will a target group approach be), the financial scope of
firms to be able to take measures, and their competitiveness. The firms selected
by the Ministry of the Environment, some 12,000 in all, together cause more than
90 percent of all industrial pollution. The non-selected firms have not been re-
lieved of their responsibility to make an environmental effort. For these firms the
reduction targets are not set out in detail in a Declaration of Intention for the
branch in question (see step 3), but stipulated by means of licensing.
The third step involves drawing up a Declaration of Intention (covenant) for
the selected branches. This takes place in cooperation between the individual
branch organizations and the authorities involved (with the Inter-Provincial Coun-
cil, the Association of Dutch Municipalities, the Union of Water Boards and the
Central Government as their main representatives). This Declaration stipulates a
so-called Integral Environmental Target (IMT) for the branch in question. The
agreements laid down in this Declaration are binding and apply to all the firms in-
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volved. The target group itself can indicate (see step 5)  by means of which
measures and in what order it wants to fulfill this target.
The fourth step is to conduct a publicity campaign. The individual firms in
an industrial branch are informed of the environmental tasks that were agreed in
the Declaration of Intention for the branch as a whole. The campaign is focused
particularly on making a firm aware of its own responsibility.
The fifth step is drawing  up an implementation plan for the branch of in-
dustry (in the case of homogeneous branches of industry) or drawing up an
industrial environmental policy plan per firm (in the case of heterogeneous
branches of industry). Such a plan will indicate in detail which measures will be
used to meet the intended integral environmental target. The plan can also set
out agreements concerning licensing procedures. An implementation plan (ho-
mogeneous branches of industry) is drawn up for the industrial branch as a whole
through negotiations between the authorities involved (at the central level) and
the branch organization(s). A business environmental plan (for the heteroge-
neous branches of industry) is drawn up in detail at the level of the individual firm
through consultation between the authorities involved (at the local level) and the
firm in question.
The sixth step is the elaboration and application of these measures. Al-
though more preliminary worrk can be done in homogeneous firms by the central
branch organization than in heterogeneous branches, in both types of branches
additional work will still have to be done by the individual firms themselves. Firms
will have to make an analysis, whether or not on the basis of checklists issued to
them, of the environmental pollution caused by their firm. On the basis of this
analysis measures have to be developed within the firm. Even the standard
measures for homogeneous branches require further elaboration for the specific
situation of an individual firm. Next the results of measures need to be reported to
the authorities involved (Ministry of the Environment, 1992-1).
How is target group policy related to the policies aimed at the stimulation of envi-
ronmental care within firms? As far as the homogeneous branches are
concerned, the government sees a clear role for the central branch organization
in implementing in-house environmental care. The Declaration of Intention can be
seen as the kickoff for the environmental policy statement to be drawn up for
each firm individually. The implementation plan, which indicates which environ-
mental aspects within this branch are important and which standard measures
can be taken, provides a clear basis for the environmental analysis and the envi-
ronmental program. Nevertheless, the branch implementation plan will have to be
translated into concrete measures by each individual firm at its own initiative.
In the heterogeneous branches, the same applies where the function of
the Declaration of Intention is concerned. This is confirmed for the branch as a
whole and can give direction to the environmental policy statements made by the
individual firms. In heterogeneous branches the differences within the branches
themselves are too great, however, to allow for substantial preparations at the
central level for environmental analysis and the environmental program. The ex-
ternal function of the environmental policy plan is to provide the authorities
involved with an insight into the measures the firm wants to take to reduce envi-
ronmental pollution within four years, with a ‘window’ to the following years. The
internal function of the environmental policy plan is that it can direct the environ-
mental program drawn up in the context of the environmental care system.
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Eventually the agreements that were drawn up on the level of the industrial
branch as a whole and that were translated into individual plans at the level of the
firm, should serve as the basis for licensing and enforcement as it takes place in
the context of current legislation. Thus these agreements reduce the policy-
making freedom of the licensing institutions. Without such an approach, after all,
uniformity of these policies would be out of the question. Although we do see an
in-depth binding of the competent authorities, this does not mean that the proce-
dural rules with regard to matters such as participation and objection are put to
one side. These possibilities remain intact. By means of licensing the agreements
that were laid down in the covenants on the basis of target group negotiations are
given a legally binding form (of the covenants it is not clear at the moment
whether they are also legally binding). At the decentralized level target group
policy can thus be legally formalized.
3.3 Results of the target group policy for industries
In the initial plans for a target group policy for industries in 1990 thirteen bran-
ches were selected for a policy approach by covenants. However very soon the
planning schedule appeared to be quite unrealistic: although covenant
agreements were expected for all the selected branches in 1992, in the begin-
ning of 1993 they only had been realized in the case of three branches. In 1993
a new planning schedule was adopted, but even with that schedule only for one
branch the covenant agreement was in time. In all cases with a delay in the
agreement on a covenant, the delay was caused by very different problems in
the negociation process: the uncertainty about the judicial status quo of the co-
venant (basic metal industry), the economical and technical feasibility of
emission reduction goals (chemical industry), the emission profile in the refe-
rence year (metal-electro industry), the development of a detailed handbook
(textile industry), and the increasment of the NOx emission due to the applicati-
on of combined heat power (paper industry). The paper industry example
learned the policy makers that an approach per branch might generate new
problems from an integral chain management point of view. The result in 1996
is that the seven realized covenants cover the greater part of the industrial pol-
lution in the Netherlands. With respect to five selected branches (leather,
mineral products, brick, concrete, and wood preservation industry) it has been
decided that a covenant will hardly have a surplus value. In the case of two
branches negociations are still going on in order to reach agreement on a co-
venant (Van den Berg, 1996).
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Figure 2 The planning and realization of covenants with industrial branches
Realized Covenants Planning 1990 Planning 1993
basic metal industry (1992 / heterogeneous) 1991
graphic industry (1993 / homogeneous) 1990
chemical industry (1993 / heterogeneous) 1991
dairy food industry (1994 / heterogeneous) 1992 1994
metal-electro industry (1995 / homo-heterogeneous) 1992 1994
textile industry (1996 / heterogeneous) 1992 1994
paper industry (1996 / homogeneous) 1992 1994
Planned Covenants 1996 Planning 1990 Planning 1993
rubber/plastics industry (1996 / heterogeneous) 1992 1995
meat industry (1997 / heterogeneous) 1992 1994
Cancelled Covenants 1996
brick industry (homogeneous) 1992 1995
concrete industry (homogeneous) 1992 1995
wood preservation industry (homogeneous) - 1995
leather industry (homogeneous) 1992 1995
mineral products industry (homogeneous) 1992 1995
In the case of heterogeneous branches, the affiliated firms have to implement
the agreed covenants into firm specific implementation plans. In practice the
contents of these firm specific plans stay behind compared to what has been
agreed upon in the branch covenant: a lot of unclearness is existing with res-
pect to the interpretation of concepts like `state of the technology’, `best
technical means’, `best practicable means’; the financial argumentation in the
case of bottle-necks is weak; very often the firm management doesn’t formulate
a management statement on the environmental strategy of the firm. The per-
mitting authorities mostly only judge on headlines of a firm specific plan since
they won’t stake the good relations built up during the negociations with a firm
concerning its implementation plan. Firms consider their obligation to report ye-
arly on the progress of the implemention plan as a heavy burden, and for that
reason they badly comply with this obligation. They are permanently searching
for the most optimal reporting system. In case of firms which don’t work hard
enough on the implementation of a covenant, permitting authorities are allowed
to put pressure on them by stiffening the permit requirements. In practice ho-
wever authorities hardly use their power to stick the stragglers. Although in the
last four covenants (dairy foods, metal-electro, paper, textile industry) the
government commited itself to user this power in order to prevent unequal
competition within a branch (Van den Berg, 1996)
For each branch a consultation group with representatives out of the branch
and the public authorities involved coordinates the implementation of the target
group policy. One of their tasks is to report yearly on the progress for the
branch as a whole and to evaluate this in the light of the targets that are agreed
upon in the covenant. However the targets in the covenant may be appositio-
ned when economical developments within the branch are going bad, when the
environmental efforts might harm the international competition of the branch too
much, or when technical means are not available to generate the efforts nee-
ded. A covenant may be prematurely terminated in case of unwanted social
consequences or in case of unforseen circumstances. Besides that, each co-
venant needs to be evaluated after four years. Until now only in the case of the
chemical industry covenant a formal evaluation has been conducted. The con-
clusions came out to be less critical than expected and for that reasons the
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consultaion group for this branch didn’t want to apposition parts of the cove-
nant. For the time being public authorities as well as industrial authorities do
agree on continuing the target group policy for industries on the basis of a con-
sensus approach, partly because of the propitious evaluation of the chemical
industry covenant and because of the avoidance of hard measures against
straggling firms (Van den Berg, 1996)
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4 A characterization of the target group policy for industries
Target group oriented policy can be considered as a special form of poli-
cy, with specific chracteristics and related advantages and disadvantages. The
specific characteristics of the target group policy for industries can be described
in two ways. At first a policy can be defined as a structure of goals, means (po-
licy instruments) and time preferences (Hoogerwerf, 1989). A target group
policy can be analysed by looking at the goals that policy makers want to achie-
ve, the policy instruments that are used for this, and the time preferences that
are made in this respect. Although a target group policy is more than that: it is
also a specific way of policy making. This will become obvious if we look at the
way in which the distinctive policy processes (formulating, legitimating, imple-
menting) take place. So characteristics of the target group policy also can be
found by looking at the organisation and the processing of policy processes.
We will look at it in both ways.
4.1 Specific characteristics of the policy contents
To start with specific characteristics of a policy we may look at the policy
goals. Of course a policy is made in order to reduce the environmental burden
of a target group and to contribute to the abatement of environmental problems.
However these goals, which also can be considered as environmental stan-
dards, are not specific for a target group policy. In general they are written
down in policy documents and by that they function as boundary conditions for
a target group policy as well as for other forms of policy like `area oriented poli-
cies’.
Besides that, a target group policy is also focusing on process oriented
goals which are serving to achieve the environmental standards better or ear-
lier. These proces oriented goals have the character of internediate goals whic
are contributing to the achievement of the final goals which are more environ-
ment related. Some of these more specific goals have been mentioned already
in the overview of the developmenet of the target group policy.
At first, from the beginning the target group policy was focusing on the
integration of environmental measures at the level of a target group. This
search for integration can be seen on the level of a target group or branch as a
whole as well as on the level of an individual firm.
Secondly, the target group policy is trying to initiate interiorization and
self-initiative among (members of) target groups. This goal is obviously related
to the previous one, while a real integration of environmental measures taken
by a firm can only take place if this firm considers itself in an early stage the en-
vironmental consequences of its decisions.
Another goal which is related to this concerns the creation of suffficient
support for environmental policy. Interiorization and self-initiative will only work
if target groups are convinced of the necessity of a progressive environmental
policy and if they forget to see public environmental policy as an external threat,
but instead of that do consider it as an incentive which creates opportunities for
the improvement of the firm’s performances.
All the goals mentioned above can definitely be typified as matters that in
the perspectives of all the actors involved are `worthy’ and `positive’. Integrati-
on, interiorization, support, no human being with sense could be against it. Of
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course this `positive’ image has its consequences for the choice of policy in-
struments which are used to achieve all these beautifull things. In general these
instruments have a stimulating character (Kuijpers and Glasbergen, 1987).
In order to create sufficient support target group policy gives an impor-
tant role to communicative policy instruments. The creation of mutual
understanding requires a lot of explanation of opinions and motives and it even
requires a willingness to listen to opnions and arguments of others. Initiating
mutual consultation is an essential part of this policy. Consultation is also of
great importance for the integration goal. The finetuning of measurements re-
quires a considerable knowledge of the management policy as well as the
circumstances within firms. Since this information is not available among all the
actors involved, the mutual providing with information is necessary. In this con-
sultation context not only the fact is important that actors are on speaking terms
with each others, but above all the way in which they are speaking with each
other. In other words, what are they doing with mutual consultation as an in-
strument. Another important communicative instrument is the provision of
information towards the individual frims and implementing public authorities that
are not involved themselves in the consultations on the level of the target
group. Since the policy implementation is a matter for the individual level it is
quite important for the policy success that consultation results and other as-
pects of the policy contents are communicated precisely. This communication
especially concerns the core of the target group policy: making firms feeling
responsibility and stimulating their self-initiative.
The function of consultations as part of a target group policy is not only
`informing’ and `motivating’. The consultations are also aiming on making
agreements that take effect with respect to the contents of the policy and the
way in which this is going to be implemented. It is not surpising that covenants
are a commonly used instrument for this purpose. A covenant can be defined
as a written agreement between different parties involved. The fixation of writ-
ten agreements has a meaning for the obviousness of the consultation results
and the policy contents. This obviousness has a component that concerns the
matters upon which has been agreed and a normative component that con-
cerns what the parties involved may expect from each other in the future. In
other words, although covenants are gentlemens agreements, it is intended that
they are not without engagement: the parties involved are making commitments
to each other that are intended to take effect. Firms are making commitments
on a range of activities through which they will contribute to the implementation
of the policy. The public authorities involved are making commitments on a ran-
ge of policy measurements in a certain time order to provide the firms with more
judicial certainty for the future.
A third instrument with a clear stimulating character is facilitating with
personnel and financial support. These are socalled facilitating instruments.
The target group policy for industries starts at the level of the ministry with a
special task force of staff people who take responsibility within the department
for the socalled `target group management’. Besides that mostly a facilitating
office is supporting the consultations at the target group level to take care of
implementation work and administrative tasks. Personnel support may be in the
form of paying for an independent consultation leader or process consultant.
Such a `facilitator’ might be a guarantee that the consultations will have a result
and that all parties involved are going to adopt that result. Financial support
may also concern financing research, pilot projects or information campaigns.
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In the context of target group policies hardly no legislation is used for
achieving the policy goals. Although covenants include norms and behavioral
rules, the judicial engagement of this normative component is not complete
clear. Therefore it is considered to be necessary to use existing legislative
(permitting) competences to formalize the covenant agreements. So target
group policy is not replacing legislation but is additional to it. Covenant
agreements are more about the way in which authorities will act in the permit-
ting process.
4.2 Specific characteristics of the policy process
An important characteristic of the policy process is the openess during
the consultations with respect to the contents of the policy. Meaningfull con-
sultations are only possible if a policy is not fixated on all details. So it is
possible to talk about, to discuss and to negotiate on problem perceptions, legi-
timated interests, uncertainties and possble solutions. This openess with
respect to the policy contents (discretion or scope for policy making) has to be
distinguished from openess in a sense that the process is accessible to everyo-
ne who wants to participate. For example environmental action groups and
other interested parties cannot participate in the consultations. The openess is
not only effectuated in the way in which consultations are organized, but also in
the possibility to fix in agreements that some issues do need further investigati-
ons or further consensus building. The policy is considered to be a continuous
learning process or a `policy in motion’ (VROM, 1992-2, p.13). Thirdly, the ope-
ness with respect to the policy contents is effectuated in the nature of the
agreements and their timing. Often agreements are made on emission reducti-
on goals for a longer period. By that goal prescriptions are being used more
than prescriptions with respect to means. Firms do get more freedom in choo-
sing and timing measures through which they think they can achieve the policy
goals. In that way it is going to be easier for firms to apply processintegrated
measures, which are prefered from an evironmental control point of view as
well as from a firm management point of view instead of clean up technologies.
For that matter it has to be remarked that openess doesn’t mean that
anything can be a matter of discussion.The overall environmental standards as
formulated in official policy documents are seen as boundary conditions for the
discussion. Also during the consultation process the discretion is decreasing
since the participants in a latter stage of the process can be held responsible
for the agreements in an earlier stage.
Secondly, characteristic for target group policies is a multi-staged policy
process (De Bruijn and Lulofs, 1991). This means that delegation and repre-
sentation are crucial elements in the policy making process, because without
representation too many actors would be involved in the consultation process.
However through this method of working binding agreements between various
parties are being created. The covenant agreements are meant to be binding
not only upon the subscibers, but also upon their rank and file. In the case of
the affiliated firms as well as in the case of the affiliated public authorities at the
decentral level it is not as a matter of course that they will follow the centrally
made agreements without having any influence. Quite remarkable in this me-
thod of working is that branch and other representatives not only function as a
speaker for the interests of their rank and file, but also are in charge of the im-
plementation of the national environmental policy through implementing the
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covenant on which they agreed (Doorewaard, 1990, p.45). Therefore the coo-
peration of these organisations is an essential chain in the policy process.
The multi-staged policy making is also meant to achieve at the level of
target groups or branches a more uniform policy. At the level of target groups
(branches) agreements are made that will be directive towards the permitting to
individual firms. By this it is expected that unequal competition within a branch
through differences in permit prescriptions can be prevented. This uniformizati-
on or standardization of the permitting already has been preceded by the
CUWVO-guidances for surface water emissions and the Dutch Emission Gui-
dances (NER) for air emissions. It is obvious that this standardization requires
a certain homogenity on the side of the target group: standardized solutions can
only be developed for comparable cases.
Another important characteristic of the target group policy making is that
to some extent already existing policy instruments are being used. This is evi-
dent in the way in which this policy is dealing with the permitting and
enforcement of existing legislation. As has been written above the agreements
on the target group level need to be directive to the issuing and enforcement of
permits which are based on existing legislation.Therefore the discretion of the
permitting and enforcing authorities is being diminished by the agreements.
Without such a method of working there would be no uniformization of the poli-
cy. Although there is a binding of the authorities to the contents of the
covenant, this leaves procedural rules concerning citizen participation as they
are. With the help of the permitting authorities the covenant agreements do get
a judicial fixation, although in advance it is uncertain if the covenant
agreements can have a binding effect. In that sense permits do get again a co-
difying character by fixating agreements or consensus that have been reached
by other means in the societal reality.
An aspect of permitting which is related to the integrative character of
target group policies is that also at the individual firm level an integration of the
different issued permits is needed. This means that the permitting authorities
(provinces, municipalities, water boards) have to finetune their activities. So
even at the local level a somewhat permanent consultation structure should be
found.
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5 Relatively inaccessible target populations
5.1 Instrument characteristics in policies on inaccessible target populations
While the Dutch government developed extensive target group policies with re-
gard to accessible target groups over the years, for target groups which are
difficult to access this policy has hardly taken off yet. An example is the target
group consumers. In the second National Environmental Policy Plan (NMP-2)
(Ministry of the Environment, 1993) consumers are characterized as a target
group which is difficult to access. “They are often faced with a lack of insight into
the environmental pollution caused by their own activities, which makes them
more difficult to address. Agreements are impossible or next to impossible to
make. Individually focused instruments such as licensing are more difficult to ap-
ply for a number of these groups.”
To pursue a target group policy, the characteristics of the target group are
of major importance. Particularly the accessibility of the target group plays a ma-
jor role. The target group characteristic ‘accessibility’ is defined by us in terms of
its capability of being addressed: to what extent can we negotiate with the target
group? We can determine the accessibility of a target group on the basis of vari-
ous aspects.
An obvious factor which determines the accessibility of a target group is its
size. The size of a target group is determined by the number of members of the
target group. The difficulty involved in addressing the target group decreases in
equal proportion to the number of its members. The more members a target
group has, the more its accessibility as a group is reduced, because the individ-
ual approach to these members often reaches the limits of what is practically
possible. An example is the target group of the Dutch car drivers. Holland has
some 9 million people with a driving license and 5.6 million cars. In view of its
size, therefore, the target group ‘car drivers’ can hardly be addressed. The
smaller the target group, the greater the chance that its members can be ad-
dressed individually. This makes it easier for a policy maker to get in touch with
the individual members of the target group of energy-producing firms.
A factor which is related to this is the degree of organization of the target
group. The accessibility of a target group is also determined by its degree of or-
ganization, in the sense  that this influences the possibilities a policy-maker has
for entering into discussion with the target group and arriving at possible agree-
ments. In cases where the target group is hardly organized at all, it can hardly be
a participant in decision-making. Here we return once again to our example. Car
drivers are represented, among others, by an organization of road users (General
Dutch Union of Road Users - ‘ANWB’). However, this organization itself has indi-
cated that it does not wish to be seen as a lobby of the car drivers. Furthermore,
car drivers as consumers are represented by the Consumer’s Union (‘Con-
sumentenbond’). On the other hand, a target group with a high degree of
organization is capable of being addressed as a party in the policy-making proc-
ess; as such it will occupy a more powerful position than less well organized
target groups with respect to other actors in the policy-making network. As the
degree of organization of the target group increases, more possibilities are cre-
ated to participate as an actor in the policy-making network. Examples of them
were seen in previous paragraphs. A certain degree of organization is thus a
condition for a target group for participation in policy-making, and as such also a
condition for directly influencing the choice of instrument. The degree of organi-
zation of a target group is important both from the point of view of the target
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group and from that of the policy-maker. On the one hand we have seen that the
degree of organization partly determines the possibilities of a target group to in-
fluence policy-making. A target group characterized by a high degree of
organization is able to make itself heard and possibly to steer the outcome in the
desired direction. On the other hand we should realize that the degree of organi-
zation of the target group can influence the legitimacy of the decision-maker. A
target group characterized by a high degree of organization can lend a certain le-
gitimacy to government actions due to its participation in policy-making.
The above factors should not be seen as isolated variables in determining
the accessibility of a target group. The degree of organization of the target group
and the number of its members are related and can determine its accessibility
both individually and in combination with each other. Thus a relatively large target
group with a very high level of organization may well be just as accessible as a
very small target group whose members can be addressed individually.
One target group characteristic that we should bear in mind in view of the
accessibility factor is the electoral importance attached to the target group. Elec-
toral importance is partly related to the size of the target group. Since the
inaccessible nature of a target group may be partly due to its large size, the
electoral importance of such a group is also a major factor in many cases. If we
look at our example again, we see that a (relatively inaccessible) target group
such as car drivers is of great electoral importance to the policy-making govern-
ment. Here we should note, however, that in addition to the exceptionally large
size of the target group, the direct relation between the members of the target
group ‘car drivers’ and the authorities also plays a part in the electoral system. In
view of the great electoral importance of this target group, it may be important for
the policy-making authorities to be aware of the opinions of such a target group
and possibly to take its views into account in policy-making. In the case of the
target group car drivers its great electoral importance is reflected, for instance, in
the frequent studies on the social support for an increase of petrol duties.
Finally, the accessibility concept needs to be nuanced somewhat. Also
target groups that are difficult to access may be capable of being addressed to
a certain extent. Often relatively inaccessible target groups are represented in
decision-making process in one way or another, as we have seen in the case of
the target group ‘car divers’, who are represented by the organization of road us-
ers, the ‘ANWB’. The question is to what extent they are actually represented, in
the sense that the representative body is a reflection of (the interests of ) those
being represented. This means that a representing actor represents the entire
target group and is not just aware of its interests, but is also able to reconcile
these interests so that the group may present itself as a single organization. In
the case of the road users’ organization, the ‘ANWB’, this did not work out. Al-
though the ANWB is probably well aware of the interests of car drivers, it has
become obvious over the years that it is unable to reconcile these interests.
Sabatier and McLaughlin (1990) mention the equality and similarity of the opin-
ions of the leaders and those of the ordinary members of target groups. They
conclude that the opinions of leaders and ordinary members are very likely to
coincide, or alternatively, that the opinions of the leaders will be more extreme
than those of the ordinary members,
In addition to the reconciliation of the objectives of the target group and
those of the representative body/bodies, another important question is to what
extent the representatives are able to mobilize the target group to make changes.
Here we are basically talking about the mobilization of the resources of the target
group. Confidence of the target group in and consensus with the representative
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bodies is a requirement to make the target group change its behaviour at the in-
sistence of its representatives. Thus the question is to what extent the target
group recognizes the authority of its representatives. If the target group recog-
nizes the authority of its representatives, it will be more prepared to undertake
action at the insistence of its representatives. If the representatives lack authority
over the target group, it is less likely that they will be able to mobilize the re-
sources of the target group. In addition to voicing the views of the target group
the representative body may also be capable of mobilizing criticism, but the
question remains whether this body is actually able to stimulate the target group
to change its behaviour. This situation exists with regard to the road users’ or-
ganization the ANWB. From this point of view the ‘official’ representative body
plays a different part, therefore, than the ‘unofficial’ representative body. The ‘of-
ficial’ body seems to be able to make more promises than the ‘unofficial’ one.
The remaining actors in a process can interpret promises made by an ‘official’ or-
ganization during negotiations differently than those made by ‘unofficial’
representative bodies. Thus, if an ‘official’ body promises to mobilize its grass-
roots support, this will be valued more highly than if such a promise is made by
an ‘unofficial’ organization.
The reason why we distinguished between accessible and inaccessible
target groups lies in the fact that the accessibility of the target group may have a
direct influence on the choice of instrument. To give some examples, following
Bressers (1993) we first distinguish the following instrument characteristics:
1. A normative appeal to the obedience of the target group;
2. The extent to which the response of the government corresponds to the be-
haviour of the target group;
3. The supplying or withdrawing of resources;
4. The freedom of choice of the target group in stating whether the instrument is
applicable to its own behaviour;
5. One-sidedness or more-sidedness;
6. The role of the policy-maker in policy implementation.
In practice a policy-maker in the case of a relatively inaccessible target group is
more likely to choose a one-sided rather than a more-sided instrument, simply
because a more-sided instrument requires some form of negotiation. An instru-
ment that makes a normative appeal to the obedience of the target group is an
easy means to implement in the case of an inaccessible target group, because
there is no need to define the target group. Nevertheless, this will be no more
than a consideration in the choice of instrument at a moment when other options
prove difficult to realize. In fact, one of the disadvantages of a normative appeal
to the obedience of a relatively inaccessible target group is that the  instrument
requires enforcement and the target group is difficult to access by definition. En-
forcement is problematic when we are faced with a relatively inaccessible target
group. Also an instrument that offers freedom of choice to the target group when
it is applied, is an easily applicable if the target group is difficult to access. If the
policy-maker offers this freedom to the target group, he himself does not have to
define the target group; while if the target group is not given this freedom, in most
cases first an inventory will have to be drawn up of the target group.
If we now look at the instrument characteristic ‘supplying or denying re-
sources to the target group’, we find that this characteristic is closely related to
the instrument characteristic ‘freedom of choice of the target group in the applica-
tion of the instrument’. Offering freedom in the application of the instrument is
only feasible, generally speaking, if resources are made available to the target
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group. A situation where the target group itself can and may decide whether it
certain resources will be withdrawn, is hardly realistic. However, contrary to ex-
pectations this situation does occur in the Netherlands with regard to the choice
of consumers in favour of  ‘green electricity’. In this case consumers choose vol-
untarily to either contribute to a ‘green’ electricity supply in the form of a higher
Kilowatt/hour price, or to apply the basic rate to their consumption, so that they do
not contribute to the generation of sustainable energy. We should place this in a
wider perspective, however: consumers who choose the higher ‘green electricity
rate’ are eligible for a lower energy charge on their consumption in the long run.
Nevertheless, even though the example of ‘green power’ is the only one that can
be imagined, it is still an example in practice of the previously outlined unrealistic
situation. Here we assume that granting freedom of choice to the target group if
the instrument is applied is balanced by the supplying of resources and, vice
versa, that the withdrawal of resources automatically implies that the target group
does not have any freedom of choice. Below we shall use an instrument with
these characteristics as an example: in increase in the charge on petrol.
The chance that the policy-maker will choose an instrument where he him-
self plays a major part in policy implementation is lower in the case of a relatively
inaccessible target group than in cases where the target group is easily accessi-
ble. The policy-maker feels that the target group is difficult to access, but this
does not mean that the target group may not be easier to access for others. In
such a situation the policy-maker can choose to leave policy implementation to
e.g. an intermediary organization closer to the target group.
Summarizing, we see that in practice instruments that are focused on a relatively
inaccessible target group generally correspond in terms of three characteristics.
Generally, these instruments do not make a normative appeal to the obedience of
the target group. Furthermore, the instruments that are focused on a relatively in-
accessible target group are generally characterized by their one-sidedness. In
such a case more-sidedness can only occur with respect to other actors than the
target group. In the case of an inaccessible target group a more-sided instrument
is hardly feasible in view of the elusive nature of the target group. Finally, instru-
ments that are focused on a relatively inaccessible target group are generally
characterized by the fact that policy implementation is left to other actors than the
policy-makes themselves. This is quite obvious if we realize that the target group
is difficult to access for the policy-makers, while this may not be the case for other
actors. In such a case the policy-maker is more likely to opt for implementation by
an actor who has easier access to the target group.
Since the instruments that are focused on relatively inaccessible target
groups roughly coincide in terms of these three instrument characteristics, these
characteristics are therefore not interesting if we are looking for an explanation for
the choice in favour of different instruments focused on this target group. These
characteristics are related to the general situation with regard to inaccessible tar-
get groups and thus do not offer an explanation of the choice of instrument. Such
an explanation may be deduced, though, from the other (generally different) in-
strument characteristics. These consist of ‘the extent to which the government
response corresponds to the behaviour of the target group’, ‘the supplying to or
withdrawing of resources from the target group’ and ‘the freedom of choice of the
target group in stating whether the instrument is applicable to its own behaviour’.
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5.2  Network characteristics in relatively inaccessible target groups
The characteristics of the chosen policy instruments are largely determined by
the characteristics of the policy network where this choice of instruments made.
To get a full picture of the processes that take place within a network, we have to
look at the network as a whole. Here the individual actors play a part, but always
in relation with each other. The characteristics of actors are only interesting,
therefore, if placed in a wider perspective, that of the network. Only in comparison
with the characteristics of other actors can the characteristics of certain actors
stand out, and as such play an important role in the processes within the network.
Thus, the level of analysis here is that of policy networks rather than that of the
individual actors.
The characteristics of networks can have a direct influence on the char-
acteristics of the policy instrument that is chosen during the decision-making
process. Various characteristics of networks may be distinguished that influ-
ence the choice of specific policy instruments. Here we distinguish the network
characteristics ‘distribution of resources’, ‘solidarity’ and ‘intensity of interac-
tions’.
Resources can be seen in the light of power relationships. Here re-
sources are a relative concept. After all, they are considered in the light of the
relations with the resources of other actors. In the distribution of resources over
the actors in the network it is not important which actors possess which re-
sources, but rather how the use of these resources is distributed over the
actors within the network. An equal distribution may occur to a greater or to a
lesser extent. The possession of resources constitutes a basis for the power of
an actor within the network. An unequal distribution of resources over actors is
accompanied by unequal opportunities to exercise power within the network.
Actors who possess relatively many resources, or a relatively large quantity of a
given resource, are in a position to exercise power over developments within
the network. If resources are evenly distributed over the actors, a situation of
mutual dependence, an equal power base, is created: in such a situation actors
cannot determine developments within the network without support from one
another. Here we distinguish various categories of resources: physical goods,
people, information, time, money, rights and powers, external consensus and
internal consensus.
In fact, the interchangeability of resources often has a major influence
when a situation of interdependency is created. If resources are fully inter-
changeable (as is often the case with financial resources) an equal distribution
of resources is often accompanied by interdependence of the actors. However,
if resources are not interchangeable (as may occur in the case of rights and
powers) an equal distribution of resources does not automatically have to mean
that the actors are interdependent. Conversely, in cases where there is an un-
even distribution of resources and where they are fully interchangeable, an
actor who has relatively more resources available by definition holds a more in-
dependent position compared to the other actors. While in cases where there is
an uneven distribution of resources and they are not fully interchangeable, the
actor who possesses relatively more resources does not automatically hold a
more independent position compared to the other actors. Here we consider the
distribution of resources over the actors within the network as one of the most
influential factors on the choice of policy instruments.
Solidarity between actors is defined by us here as the extent to which
actors within a  network sympathize with each other’s goals and with the extent
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to which they correspond in terms of their underlying motivation for corre-
sponding goals. The motivation of actors can correspond to a greater or to a
lesser extent. Here we differentiate the extent to which actors sympathize with
each other’s goals and the extent to which they agree in terms of their motiva-
tion to achieve these goals. Actors can agree in terms of their goals, while their
motivation to pursue these goals may be different. In cases where the motiva-
tion for the common goal is the same, we assume a higher degree of solidarity
between the actors involved than in cases where only their objectives corre-
spond while their motivation to achieve them does not. This refers not only to
in-depth objectives but also to process objectives. Thus the function of the net-
work for the actors can be part of the motivation of the actors. For instance, the
network may be based mainly on a problem-solving motivation or may fulfill the
function for actors to involve other actors in the area of attention in question. In
our opinion, solidarity is one of the most strongly determining factors in the
choice of policy instruments within the network.
The intensity of interactions refers both to interactions that take place
within a specific policy-making process and outside of such a process. Actors
who interact within the framework of a certain policy-making process can also
meet in other processes outside this process. This contact outside the process
in question, however, certainly contributes to the intensity of the interactions
between actors. Here we should not lose sight of the difference between the
intensity of the interaction and solidarity. A high degree of intensity of interac-
tions does not necessarily have to correspond to a high degree of solidarity.
However, a high intensity of interactions, provided it takes place voluntarily,
does indicate common interests (e.g. on the basis of interdependence). These
interests do not have to be covered by the process in which the network is ac-
tive and involved at that moment. Interaction can be seen as a means to
achieve certain goals, or as the goal in itself. The intensity of interactions within
the network can influence the characteristics of the chosen policy instrumen-
tarium.
In a target group approach policy instruments are adjusted to specific
target groups. Here the focus is on the relation between the authorities and the
target group. The accessibility of the target group plays an important part here
and has several consequences for the way in which network characteristics in-
fluence the choice of instrument. In the network characteristics presented by us
in the above we assumed a network where the target group has an influence.
After all, these characteristics were formulated bilaterally: a number of character-
istics is deduced from the relation between target group and policy-maker. In the
case of  the inaccessible target group there can be no question of a relation be-
tween policy-maker and target. The network characteristic ‘intensity of
interactions’ thus by definition loses its validity as an explanatory variable. In the
situation of the inaccessible target group we look for an explanation of the choice
of instrument among the unilaterally formulated network characteristics. The rela-
tion between policy-maker and target group (insofar as such a relation exists) is
only relevant where it influences the attitude of the policy-maker towards the tar-
get group. This means that just as in the above, we feel that solidarity and the
distribution of resources over the actors present within the network influence on
the choice of instrument. One-sided (or unilateral) solidarity is defined by us as
the extent to which the policy-maker feels that the objectives and motivation of
the target groups correspond to his own objectives and motivation. For example:
do the mobility objectives of the government correspond to the objectives of car
drivers? The distribution of resources is seen by us in this case in terms of avail-
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ability: does an actor feel that he possesses (more than) enough resources to
achieve his objectives? In this case ‘availability of resources’ is not a relative con-
cept, but a one-sided (unilateral) concept. For example: is it within the range of
my possibilities as a policy-maker to combat traffic jams?
All in all, in the case of instrument choices we are faced with two extreme
situations between which situations are located on a continuous scale. One ex-
treme consists of the situation where a policy-maker within the policy network is
faced with an accessible target group. Such a target group part participates
(usually through representatives recognized by the target group) in the policy-
making process. The other extreme consists of the situation where the policy-
maker is faced with a target group which is difficult to access and which is not
or hardly represented in the policy-making process and thus does not partici-
pate in this. For both extremes we make assumptions about the relation
between the existence of the distinguished network characteristics and the
characteristics of the chosen policy instrument within this network. Below we
shall give an example of the way in which we can use these assumptions.
The extreme situation where a policy-maker in the policy-making network
is faced with an accessible target group is characterized by participation of the
target group in policy-making. In cases where the target group participates in
policy-making through a representative body, we assume that this will be an
‘official’ institution recognized by the target group. In other words, that both the
objectives of the target group are propagated by its representatives and that
these representatives are capable of mobilizing the resources of the target
group. In this situation the network characteristics ‘solidarity’, ‘distribution of re-
sources’ and ‘intensity of interactions’ between the actors in the network
determine the characteristics of the chosen instrument. In the case of the ac-
cessible target group we see a negotiation process between the policy-maker
and (the representatives of) the target group. Thus the independent variables
were formulated in terms of interaction: we are dealing here with objectives and
resources in relation to other actors and interactions between the actors.
The extreme situation where the policy-maker is faced with a relatively
inaccessible target group is characterized by the fact that this target group is
not or hardly represented in the policy-making process and thus does not par-
ticipate in it. In such a situation the attitude of the policy-maker towards the
target group is decisive for the choice of instrument. The characteristics of the
policy-maker which we will consider here are the (one-sided) solidarity of the
policy-maker and the extent to which resources are available to him. The one-
sided solidarity of the policy-maker is seen by us here in terms of the corre-
spondence between the objectives of the policy-maker and the objectives of the
target group (perceived by the policy-maker). The availability of resources is re-
flected in the perception of the policy-maker whether or not he possessed
sufficient resources to realize his objectives. These characteristics of the policy-
maker determine the characteristics of the chosen instrument.
The situations which are located on the continuum between the above-
mentioned extremes, are characterized by a policy-maker who is faced with a
relatively inaccessible target group which is represented in the policy-making
process, and as such is participating in this process. These situations are dis-
tinguished from both extremes by the position of the representative body. In the
extreme case of the accessible target group the representative shares the goals
of the target group, but in addition is also capable of mobilizing the resources of
the target group. In the intermediate situations there are representative bodies
(which participate in the policy-making process) which are capable of mobilizing
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the resources of the target group to a greater or lesser extent. Judging from the
extent to which the representative is capable of this, the situation can be lo-
cated between the extremes of the continuum.
An example: increase of the charge on petrol
An example of the application of the model to a relatively inaccessible target
group is seen in the increase of the charge on petrol. In 1991 the Dutch
charges on petrol were increased considerably. An explanation of the choice of
precisely this instrument can be found in the characteristics of the network
within which this instrument was realized. The petrol charge as a policy instru-
ment is characterized by the withdrawal of resources from the target group, a
lack of freedom of choice for the target group to state its acceptance of the ap-
plied instrument, and full equality. In the constructed explanatory model we
assume by order of importance that if the policy-maker according to his own
perception has insufficient resources available to realize his objectives and if,
moreover, the resources withdrawn from the target group can be added to the
supply of resources of the policy-maker, the chance will increase that the pol-
icy-maker will eventually withdraw resources from the target group. In addition
we will assume that the less the objectives of the policy-maker correspond to
his perception of the resources of the inaccessible target group, the smaller the
chance will become that the policy-maker will offer the target group freedom of
choice in the application of the instrument. Finally, regarding this case we will
also assume that the more the objectives of the policy-maker correspond to his
perception of the objectives of the inaccessible target group, and if the policy-
maker feels that he has insufficient resources available to realize his objectives,
the greater the chance will be that the policy-maker will respond proportionally to
the behaviour of the target group. In view of the importance of the former as-
sumptions we expect that on the balance, the choice in favour of an increase of
the charge on petrol as a policy instrument can be explained from a lack of soli-
darity and insufficient availability of resources to the policy-maker.
In our example we see that the Dutch charge on petrol in 1991 was in-
creased considerably in an attempt to reduce the deficit and cover expected
expenses in traffic and transport policies. Here the policy-maker, the Ministries
of Finance and of Traffic and Waterways, expected that his objectives in this
area would not correspond to those of the target group of car drivers, since they
would automatically be opposed to an increase of these charges. In other
words: one-sided solidarity was assumed to be low. As regards the availability
of resources the policy-maker in this case did not appear to possess sufficient
financial means to realize his higher goals (reduction of government expendi-
ture, covering expected expenses). The policy-maker did possess sufficient
rights and powers, however, to realize the increase of the petrol charge. The
other types of resources did not appear to play any role of importance in this
case.
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6 Towards an evaluation of the target group policy approach
For target groups which are difficult to access a specific public policy has hardly
taken off yet. To pursue a target group policy, the characteristics of the target
group are of major importance. An obvious factor which determines the accessi-
bility of a target group is its size. The size of a target group is determined by the
number of members of the target group. The difficulty involved in addressing the
target group decreases in equal proportion to the number of its members. A fac-
tor which is related to this is the degree of organization of the target group. The
accessibility of a target group is also determined by its degree of organization, in
the sense  that this influences the possibilities a policy-maker has for entering into
discussion with the target group and arriving at possible agreements. In cases
where the target group is hardly organized at all, it can hardly be a participant in
decision-making. The degree of organization of the target group and the number
of its members are related and can determine its accessibility both individually
and in combination with each other. However, the accessibility concept needs to
be nuanced somewhat. Also target groups that are difficult to access may be
capable of being addressed to a certain extent. Often relatively inaccessible tar-
get groups are represented in decision-making process in one way or another.
The question is to what extent they are actually represented, in the sense that the
representative body is a reflection of (the interests of ) those being represented.
In addition to the reconciliation of the objectives of the target group and those of
the representative body/bodies, another important question is to what extent the
representatives are able to mobilize the target group to make changes. The rea-
son why we distinguished between accessible and inaccessible target groups lies
in the fact that the accessibility of the target group may have a direct influence on
the choice of instrument.
In practice we see that instruments that are focused on a relatively inac-
cessible target group generally correspond in terms of three characteristics.
Generally, these instruments do not make a normative appeal to the obedience of
the target group. Furthermore, the instruments that are focused on a relatively in-
accessible target group are generally characterized by their one-sidedness.
Finally, instruments that are focused on a relatively inaccessible target group are
generally characterized by the fact that policy implementation is left to other ac-
tors than the policy-makes themselves.
The characteristics of the chosen policy instruments are largely deter-
mined by the characteristics of the policy network where this choice of
instruments made. Various characteristics of networks may be distinguished
that influence the choice of specific policy instruments. Here we distinguish the
network characteristics ‘distribution of resources’, ‘solidarity’ and ‘intensity of
interactions’. In a target group approach policy instruments are adjusted to spe-
cific target groups. Here the focus is on the relation between the authorities and
the target group. The accessibility of the target group plays an important part
here and has several consequences for the way in which network characteris-
tics influence the choice of instrument. In the network characteristics presented
by us in the above we assumed a network where the target group has an influ-
ence. After all, these characteristics were formulated bilaterally: a number of
characteristics is deduced from the relation between target group and policy-
maker. In the case of  the inaccessible target group there can be no question of a
relation between policy-maker and target. The network characteristic ‘intensity of
interactions’ thus by definition loses its validity as an explanatory variable. In the
situation of the inaccessible target group we look for an explanation of the choice
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of instrument among the unilaterally formulated network characteristics. The rela-
tion between policy-maker and target group (insofar as such a relation exists) is
only relevant where it influences the attitude of the policy-maker towards the tar-
get group.
Looking at the better accessible target groups which have been discussed in
this paper (the branches in industry) we first have to remark that it is still too
early for conclusions on the effectiveness of the Dutch target group policy ap-
proach. This approach is still under construction and an active implementation
practice still cannot be seen (which in itself of course is a signal). Nevertheless
it is possible to come up with critical notes on the specific characteristics of the
policy contents and the policy making process.
A first disadvantage of the target group policy approach is that the inte-
gration of environmental measures takes place is in a limited integrative
perspective: the perspective of the target group or the one of a firm. Integration
problems however do not only appear at the level of firms, but also for example
at the level of environmental themes, geographical areas and product chains.
Each form of integration from a specific perspective implies that other integrati-
ve perspectives get insufficient attention. A target group policy for industries
definitely will complicate an integrative approach that considers product chains.
From an integral chain management point of view the involvement in one con-
sultation meeting of very different target groups like energy utilities, various
industrial branches, consumers and retail trade, and waste utilization firms
would be needed to choose the most optimal environmental measures. In fact
this problem is comparable to the sectoral integration problems which occured
are the start of this all.
A second important aspect of the target group policy approach is that the
openess with respect to the policy contents not only has advantages. Openness
is not only creating possibilities for meaningfull consultations, it also might give
way to the influence of actors who will take environmental interests not serious
enough. The whole strategy of interiorization is based on the assumption that it
should be possible to get firms at a point where they are willing to internalize
the external effects of their decisions in the context of a market oriented eco-
nomy. Although general agreements for a target group as a whole might
minimalize the internal competition, they won’t have consequences in proporti-
on to foreign competitors who are partial operating under the conditions of a
classical capitalistic economy (Eastern Europe and Asia). It is very uncertain if
the Dutch industry will accept with open arms the luxuruous of interiorization on
a voluntary base. Related to this is that the voluntariness of agreements has its
natural boundaries in that a firm will never accept voluntary measures which in
fact will end its production activities.
Also the multi-staged character of the policy making process not only has
advantages. The consultation structure requires huge investments in terms of
time and human power. In other words, a lot is invested in the policy formulation
process, while the implementation  process (where it comes to the envrion-
mental results) still is not in operation. Besides, the policy content risks
unclearness since so many different agreements of different actors need to be
incorporated. One who wants to know the policy content wil not find some clear
policy documents, but has to collect a large amount of different intention decla-
rations, implementation programs and other documents of various target
groups. Since the policy implementation is also hidden within the branch orga-
nizations, the implementation structure is difficult to overview. In between the
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first signals that the environmental policy might turn into a chaos have reached
the political arena (Volkskrant, 30 oktober 1993).
An important problem with respect to the role of intermediate organizati-
ons is their role towards their rank and file. Since the degree of organization of
target groups and branches differs a lot, a large amount of firms might not be
represented in the consultation process and therefore these firms are difficult to
adress for compliance with the covenant agreements made. Besides, in general
the representing branch organizations hardly have the power to push unwilling
members to compliance or to take disciplinary measures.
Futher the target group policy approach has to deal with some internal
contradictions. On the one hand it is considered to be important to create clear-
ness and certainty for firms with respect to future policy developments. On the
other hand this is difficult to unify with the idea of `policy in motion’. A policy in
motion implies that some issues will be pushed forward on the agenda, that
there might be reasons to re-open the discussion on issues on which already
agreements were reached, and that policy experiences might lead to a refor-
mulation of the policy contents and a restructuring of the policy process.
Another example of a contradiction is the simultaneous striving for uni-
formity and integration at the firm level. Uniformity assumes general rules and
agreements, while in most cases integration at the firm level only can be reali-
zed by taking individual circumstances into account. The striving for uniformity
may also lead to a dictate of the pace and contents of the agreements by the
most complicated cases within a branch. For these cases additional research
and consultation efforts might be necessary, while firms with rather simple pro-
blems and solution opportunities could work harder on the implementation of
environmental measures and get earlier results.
Despite the mentioned objections and possible problems, we shouldn’t
forget that the target group policy approach is a sincere attempt to learn from
the limitations of environmental policies in the past. Problems concerning the
policy support and policy integration are realistic and demand for a satisfying
answer. That the ideal policy approach won’t exist is something that will be un-
derstood by everyone who is involved in policy practice or policy research.
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